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ACCESS OF SINGLE WOMEN TO FERTILITY TREATMENT:  
A CASE OF INCIDENTAL DISCRIMINATION? 
SUMMARY 
 
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the extent to which single women have access to 
publicly-funded fertility treatment. It claims that, despite the fact that great progress has been 
made in removing gender inequalities in the area of assisted reproduction in England and 
Wales in recent years, there are points in the regulatory framework that still allow for 
discrimination against single women. The paper builds on recent studies concerning the 
reforms brought about by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (HFEA 2008). 
However, it focuses on publicly-funded treatment, thus directing scholarly attention away 
from the controversies over the amended s 13(5) HFEA 1990. It argues that the primary 
reason for remaining inequalities can be traced back to: a) the limitations of the current 
legislative framework, b) the ambiguities inherent in the regulatory framework, which in the 
context of publicly-funded fertility treatment is determined by the NICE clinical guidelines 
and CCGs and Health Boards' resource allocation policies, and c) the remaining confusion 
about the relationship between ‘welfare of the child’ assessments and eligibility criteria in 
NHS rationing decisions. The paper argues that the current regulation does not go far enough 
in acknowledging the inability of single women to conceive naturally, but at the same time 
that it struggles to address the fluidity of contemporary familial relationships. The analysis 
presents an opportunity to contribute to debates about the role of law in shaping the scope of 
reproductive autonomy, gender equality, and social justice. 
KEYWORDS: Access to treatment, discrimination, IVF treatment, NICE guidelines, single 
women, welfare of the child 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the legal position of single women in the context of 
publicly-funded fertility treatment in England and Wales. For the purposes of this article the 
term ‘single women’ refers to women without a partner receiving treatment.1 The 2008 
amendments to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA 1990) aimed at 
bringing the Act into line with the fast-progressing advances in reproductive medicine, the 
deep social changes affecting ‘traditional family’ structures, and the strengthening of human 
rights and anti-discrimination laws with regard to sex, gender, and sexual orientation.2 A 
series of amendments concerning the ‘welfare of the child’ principle, parenthood, gamete 
donation, and surrogacy aimed at securing access to services providing assisted reproduction 
techniques (ART)3 for same-sex couples and single women. One of the most controversial 
debates involved the amendment of s 13 (5) HFE Act 1990,4 replacing the ‘need for a father’ 
with the ‘need for supporting parenting’ in the welfare of the child assessments. In order to 
align NHS practice with these changes and with advances in reproductive medicine, in 2013 
NICE issued new fertility guidelines.5 Two years later and almost six years after the relevant 
provisions of the HFEA 2008 entered into force in October 2009 the issue remains highly 
controversial.  
                                            
1
 The term has not been defined by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, but the proposed 
definition was adopted in its recent responses to FOI requests discussed later in the paper.  
2
 Human Rights Act 1998, Adoption and Children Act 2002, Civil Partnership Act 2004 and later also the 
Equality Act 2010.  
3
 Fertility treatment falls into 3 main types: (1) medical treatment (2) surgical treatment and (3) assisted 
reproduction techniques (ART) which includes any treatment that deals with means of conception other than 
vaginal intercourse, such as intrauterine insemination (IUI), intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), or in vitro 
fertilisation (IVF). It is the third type of ART treatment that constitutes the main focus of this analysis. 
4
 Hansard Reports, HC Deb 12 May 2008, vol 475, cols 1063-1171 < http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2007-
08/humanfertilisationandembryologyhl/stages.html> All internet resources accessed on 23 April 2015. 
5
 NICE, ‘CG156 Fertility: Assessment and treatment for people with fertility problems’ (London: National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence 2013) <https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg156/resources/updated-
nice-guidelines-revise-treatment-recommendations-for-people-with-fertility-problems>. 
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On the one hand, it has been generally accepted that the 2008 reforms have removed 
all discriminatory provisions from the legislation.6  Others believe that the Act has simply 
aligned the existing law with an already liberal medical practice and in this respect it is a 
display of powerful yet merely symbolic imagery.7 Nevertheless, as the number of NHS 
clinics providing fertility treatment to persons defined as ‘contextually’8 or ‘socially’9 
infertile has been on the rise, media reports about the preferential treatment of these patients 
over heterosexual couples have increased.10 This criticism of NHS practices has been further 
supported by politicians across the political spectrum.11 On the other hand, the regulation and 
practice of fertility treatment seem far more complex. Recent studies suggest that there is a 
divergence between attitudes towards lesbian patients, who are perceived as ‘ideal patients’, 
and single female patients whose abilities to become parents are often questioned.12 
Nevertheless, to date relatively little attention has been paid specifically to the legal situation 
of single women in the context of fertility treatment. Their reproductive rights are usually 
analysed as part of broader investigations of the welfare of the child principle stipulated in s 
13 (5) HFEA 1990 or discussions of the rights of same-sex couples.13 This seems particularly 
                                            
6
 Secretary of State for Health, Post-Legislative Assessment of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
2008 (Cm 8823) (London: DH, 2014). Also: Antony Blackburn-Starza, ‘UK Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act receives Royal Assent’, Bionews 484, 17 Nov 2008. 
7
 J. McCandless and S. Sheldon ‘”No Father Required”? The Welfare Assessment in the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 2008’ (2010) 18 Feminist Legal Studies 3, 201-225, 219. 
8
 R. Deech and A. Smajdor From IVF to immortality: controversy in the era of reproductive technology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 172. Also: A. Smajdor, D.Cutas, Will artificial gametes end infertility? 
Health Care Analysis, 29 November 2013, 1-14, 8 <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24293033>.  
9
 E. Lee, J. Macvarish and S. Sheldon ‘Assessing child welfare under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 2008: a case study in medicalisation?’ (2014) 36 Sociology of Health & Illness 4, 500–515, 510. 
10
 S. Adams, S. Rainey and M. Beckford, ‘Single women being offered IVF on the NHS’, The Telegraph, 24 
October 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-health/8844762/Single-women-being-offered-IVF-
on-the-NHS.html>.  
11
 Ibidem. 
12
 E. Lee et al. (2014), op.cit. n. 9, 515. 
13
 M. Stanworth, ‘Reproductive technologies and the deconstruction of motherhood’, in: M. Stanworth (ed.) 
Reproductive technologies: Gender, motherhood and medicine (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 10–35; Cooper, 
Davina, and Herman ‘Getting ‘the family right’: Legislating heterosexuality in Britain, 1986–1991’ (1991) 10 
Canadian Journal of Family Law, 41–78; S. Millns ‘Making social judgments that go beyond the purely 
medical: The reproductive revolution and access to fertility treatment services’, in: J. Bridgeman, and S. Millns 
(eds) Law and body politics: Regulating the female body (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995), 79–104. S. Sheldon 
‘Fragmenting fatherhood: The regulation of reproductive technologies’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review, 523–
553. C. Jones Why donor insemination requires developments in family law: The need for new definitions of 
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unfortunate in light of data recently released by the Office of National Statistics, according to 
which 57% of conceptions that occurred in 2012 happened outside marriage or civil 
partnership.14 The paper aims to address this gap, setting out the following argument. 
Despite the fact that great progress has been made in removing sex and gender 
inequalities in the area of assisted reproduction in England and Wales in recent years, there 
are junctures in the legislative and regulatory framework that still allow for discrimination 
against single women in practice. The paper builds on recent studies which reveal continuing 
stigmatisation of single women stemming from traditional ideas about parenting enduring in 
the HFEA 2008.15 However, it extends such studies by evaluating the broader legislative 
context comprising human rights and anti-discrimination laws which fail to provide adequate 
protection to single women seeking fertility treatment. Within this remit, the emphasis on 
publicly-funded (NHS) treatment is important, because it helps redirect scholarly attention 
away from well-established debates about the welfare of the child principle16, to the analysis 
of other, equally important, normative factors determining access to fertility treatment for 
single women who cannot afford private treatment. Arguably, these women constitute one of 
the most vulnerable groups of patients in the area of assisted reproduction, because they 
usually have to face not only their infertility, but also the lack of financial resources alone. 
                                                                                                                                       
parenthood (Edwin Mellen Press, 2007); S. Golombok and S. Badger ‘Children raised in mother-headed 
families from infancy: a follow-up of children of lesbian and single heterosexual mothers, at early adulthood’ 
(2010) 25 Human Reproduction,1150–157. R. Harding Regulating sexuality: Legal consciousness in lesbian 
and gay lives (London: Routledge, 2010). 
14
 In 2013 conceptions outside of a marriage/civil partnership accounted for 57% of all conceptions in England 
and Wales, compared with 55% in 2003 and 45% in 1993. Although this data include informal relationships as 
well as single women (single women do not feature as a separate category), it is fair to assume that the number 
of conceptions in this group is also growing respectively. See: Office for National Statistics, Conceptions in 
England and Wales 2012, Statistical Bulletin 24 Feb 2015 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_396674.pdf >   
15
 J. McCandless and S. Sheldon, The Human Fertilisation and EmbryologyAct (2008) and the Tenacity of the 
Sexual Family Form (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 2, 175-207; E. Lee. J. Macvarish and S. Sheldon ‘Assessing 
child welfare under the human fertilisation and embryology act: the new law’ (2012) 19 Journal of Fertility 
Counselling 3, 20-25. 
16
 G. Douglas 'Assisted Conception and the Welfare of the child' (1993) Current Legal Problems 53; S. 
Golombok, ‘New families, old values: Considerations regarding the welfare of the child’ (1998) 13 Human 
Reproduction 9, 104-109; E. Jackson ‘Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle’ (2002) 65 
Modern Law Review, 176-203; E. Jackson ‘Re-thinking the pre-conception welfare principle’, in: K. Horsey and 
H. Biggs, Human Fertilisation and Embryology: Reproducing Regulation (London -New York: Routledge 
Cavendish, 2007), 47-67. 
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Furthermore, the problems concerning access to ART services become much more 
transparent in the context of the NHS system, which is subject to acute financial pressures. In 
this respect, it draws attention to the fact that the gaps in legislation are further exacerbated 
by the jurisprudential reluctance to recognise the right to access fertility treatment in the 
context of resource allocation decisions.  
Against this backdrop, the paper proposes that the primary reason for remaining 
inequalities can be traced back to the ambiguities inherent in the regulatory framework, 
which in the context of publicly-funded fertility treatment is determined by the NICE clinical 
guidelines and CCGs and Health Boards' resource allocation policies. It argues that the recent 
quest for equality and human rights has paradoxically resulted in a ‘regulatory silence’ in the 
NICE fertility guidelines which overlook single women as a separate group of patients with 
their own specific needs. It also suggests that the regulation does not go far enough in 
acknowledging single women’s impossibility to conceive naturally, but at the same time that 
it struggles to address the fluidity of contemporary familial relationships. Finally, the paper 
highlights the importance of persisting misconceptions about the relationship between 
‘welfare of the child’ assessments and eligibility criteria in the NHS for the rationing 
decisions determining the access of single women to fertility treatment.  
To elucidate the position of single women in this complex normative framework the 
paper uses several strategies. The first is doctrinal in its nature, focusing on legal analysis of 
statutes and relevant case law concerning the rights of single women in the context of fertility 
treatment. The second is a detailed examination of policy documents that regulate access to 
publicly-funded fertility treatment, in particular the NICE clinical fertility guidelines. The 
third involves analysis of empirical data derived from three sources: a) statistics provided by 
governmental and non-governmental bodies, including the Office for National Statistics and 
Fertility Fairness, b) responses to Freedom of Information (FOI) requests available on the 
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HFEA website, and c) a small pilot study based on FOI requests concerning the provision of 
NHS-funded ART services for single women, the details of which are provided later in the 
paper. This combination of approaches provides a wealth of information supporting the 
argument presented in this paper and gives insight into this underexplored area of law and 
medical practice. The paper takes forward the recent studies concerning the HFEA 2008 
amendments, contributes to debates about the role of law in shaping the scope of reproductive 
autonomy, gender equality, and social justice, and sets directions for future research 
enhancing the understanding of reproductive rights of single women in contemporary society. 
II. RIGHTS OF SINGLE WOMEN IN THE CONTEXT OF FERTILITY TREATMENT  
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK  
A. The right to access fertility treatment 
 
 The access of single women to fertility treatment is determined by the HFEA 1990, as 
amended by the HFEA 2008, which regulates the provision of assisted reproduction services 
in the UK. Despite common misconceptions empirical and theoretical studies have often 
pointed out that the original HFEA 1990 contained no explicit statutory prohibition of 
fertility treatment of any competent patients.17 Therefore, single, lesbian or older women 
were all able to lawfully receive ART services even prior to the 2008 amendments. At the 
same time, however, it has been convincingly argued that until the reform of 2008 there was a 
presumption against their treatment. The presumption was inextricably linked with the 
‘welfare of the child’ principle set out in s 13 (5) HFEA 1990, which required fertility clinics 
                                            
17
 The article provides a comprehensive summary of the recent developments of the Welfare of the Child 
principle. See: J. McCandless and S. Sheldon (2010), op. cit. 7.  See also: E. Blyth, V. Burr and A. Farrand. 
‘Welfare of the child assessments in assisted conception: A social constructionist perspective’, (2008) 26 
Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology 1, 31–43. 
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to consider the ‘need for a father’ when considering patients for treatment.18 As demonstrated 
in early parliamentary debates about the HFEA 1990 there was a clear expectation that 
fertility clinics were to discourage women who did not have a male partner from seeking 
assisted reproduction services.19 After the adoption of the Act in 1990 the Conservative 
Government at the time continued to pursue an agenda based upon the promotion of 
traditional family values, reflecting widespread beliefs about the correlation between lone 
parenthood and social and economic problems. Initially the HFEA drew heavily on the 
government’s emphasis on parenting competence and the suitability of those seeking assisted 
conception services.20 It was impossible to deny that the original text of s 13(5) invited an 
interpretation tilted toward a refusal of single motherhood and a desire to link women to men 
to form what Martha Fineman called the ‘sexual family’.21 Despite a gradual shift towards an 
increasingly liberal interpretation of the HFEA 1990 developed by the HFEA at the start of 
the new millennium22, which meant that fertility clinics rarely refused treatment of same sex 
couples and single women on the ‘welfare of the child’ grounds, proponents of changes 
highlighted the need to remove from the HFEA 1990 any in-built discrimination that placed 
an additional hurdle before some people because of their sexual orientation or relationship 
                                            
18
 Human Fertilisation and embryology Authority 1990, Ch. 37, 1st November 1990 and Human Fertilisation 
and embryology Authority 2008, Ch. 22, 13 November 2008. 
19
 Lord Ashbourne, HL Debs, Vol 515, Col 767 (6 February 1990), David Wilshire, HC Debs Vol 
174, Cols 1024–1025 (20 June 1990). Also: Lord Mackay explicitly stated that ‘there is a likelihood that 
through counselling and discussion with those responsible for treatment [women without a male partner] may be 
dissuaded from having children once they have fully considered the implications of the environment into which 
their child would be born or its future welfare.’ See: Lord Mackay (Lord Chancellor), Official Report. House of 
Lords, 6 March 1990, para 1098 
20
 Paras 3.13 – 3.16 of the HFEA’s Code of Practice had remained virtually unchanged between 1992 and 2003. 
HFEA Code of practice, 1st-5th ed. London: HFEA (1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2003). 
21
 M. Fineman, The neutered mother, the sexual family and other twentieth century tragedies (New York: 
Routledge 1995). 
22
 The 6th edition of the HFEA Code of Practice, published in 2003 stipulated that in situations when there is no 
legal father, clinics were required to assess the prospective mother’s ability, and that of others in the family or 
social circle who will share responsibility for the child, to meet the child’s needs. Although the provision had 
not specifically stipulated treatment of gay and single women, it had in fact allowed for such cases to be 
considered by IVF clinics. See: HFEA Code of Practice, London 2003-2006, para. 3.14. 
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status.23 According to those supporting the 2008 amendments, the argument was ‘about 
individuals having the right to be considered objectively for IVF treatment’.24 There was a 
clear concern that unjustified distinctions between gay and heterosexual or married and 
unmarried couples would constitute a breach of the right to respect for private life without 
discrimination (as protected by Article 8 and Article 14 ECHR). Therefore, the removal of 
the gender specific reference to the ‘need for a father’ was considered a human rights 
enhancing measure.25 It is worth noting that at the early stages of the HFE reform process, the 
need to protect single women seeking fertility treatment featured quite strongly in the 
debates. The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) argued that the 
requirement for a father discriminated against single women ‘who may have the financial and 
emotional facilities to cope with a child on their own or with other support systems, who may 
need to use donor insemination to conceive safely’.26 The then Labour Government followed 
this reasoning. Emphasising that patients’ safety could be compromised if some groups of 
women were encouraged to seek treatment privately,27 it decided to support changes which, 
after heated debates,28 replaced the ‘need for a father’ with ‘the need for supporting 
parenting’ in s 13 (5). The new 2009 Code of Practice defined supportive parenting as ‘a 
                                            
23
 E. Blyth, ‘The United Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 and the welfare of the child: 
A critique’ (1995) 9 International Journal of Children’s Rights, 417–438. See also: E. Blyth et al., (2008) op. 
cit., n.17; E. Jackson (2007) op. cit., n. 16; L. Saffron, Minutes of Evidence taken before the House of Commons 
Science and Technology Select Committee: Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law. 30th June. Ev. 43. 
In: House of Commons Science and Technology Committee ‘Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law’ 
Fifth Report of Session 2004–05. Vol II: Oral and written evidence (London, 2005) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmsctech/7/7ii.pdf. >  
24
 Norman Lamb, HC Deb 12 May 2008, vol 475, col 1090 < http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2007-
08/humanfertilisationandembryologyhl/stages.html>. 
25
 Joint House of Lords and House of Commons Committee On Human Rights - Fifteenth Report, Part 4: 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, 18 March 2008, para. 4.17: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/81/8107.htm#note170>.  
26
 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee. Human reproductive technologies and 
the law (Fifth report of session 2004–2005, HC papers 7-I and 7-II), London: HMSO, Vol I, para 99; See also: 
Joint Committee 2007 House of Lords, House of Commons Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and 
Embryos (Draft) Bill, Vol I: Report (Session 2006–2007, HL paper 169-I, HC paper 630-II), London: HMSO, 
para. 243. 
27
 Department of Health, Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: Proposals for 
Revised Legislation (Cm 6989) (London: HMSO 2006). The term ‘private treatment’ meant self-arranged door 
insemination, rather than privately funded treatment. 
28
 Hansard Reports op. cit. n. 4. 
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commitment to the health, well-being and development of the child’29 and contained a clear 
presumption against detailed welfare of the child assessment. It provided that – ‘in the 
absence of any reasonable cause for concern that any child who may be born, or any other 
child, may be at risk of significant harm or neglect’ – all prospective parents should be 
viewed as supportive parents and that ‘where centres have concern as to whether this 
commitment exists, they may wish to take account of wider family and social networks 
within which the child will be raised.’30 
Regrettably, the impact of these legislative and regulatory changes on the access of single 
women to fertility treatment in general has so far been rather ambivalent. A post-legislative 
assessment of the HFEA 2008 published by the Government in March 2014 found 
compliance with the revised requirement of supportive parenting irrespective of the sex of the 
parents.31 These findings have been partly corroborated by the most recent and relevant study 
evaluating the implementation of the HFEA 2008 and the operation of s 13(5) in clinical 
practice, conducted by Ellie Lee, Jan Macvarish, and Sally Sheldon. Their research confirmed 
that the changes introduced by the HFE Act 2008 had little impact on the provision of fertility 
services.32 Before as well as after the reform, women denied treatment in one clinic were able 
to access it elsewhere in the country. Differences in patient experience and the potential for 
discrimination have been reduced due to common procedures for welfare of the child 
assessments established by the HFEA (before and after 2008).  
At the same time, however, Lee at al.’s analysis identified areas where the 
operationalization of the principle is still problematic. Although no evidence was found of 
general ‘group discrimination’ based on sexuality or relationship status, the study found 
                                            
29
 HFEA, 8th Code of Practice (London: HFEA 2009), para 8.11 
30
 Ibidem. 
31
 Secretary of State for Health, Post-legislative Assessment of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
2008 (Cm 8823, March 2014), paragraph 30. 
32
 E. Lee, et al. (2014), op. cit., n. 9; E. Lee. J. Macvarish and S. Sheldon (2012) op. cit. n. 15. 
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‘bifurcation’ in attitudes towards lesbian patients, and single female patients. Interviews with 
fertility counsellors revealed peculiar prejudice and an interesting hierarchy between different 
groups of patients. While lesbian couples are perceived as ‘ideal patients’ and the best 
parents, better than heterosexual couples, the treatment of single women was commonly more 
contentious. Their ability to access fertility treatment was sometimes perceived as 
problematic in regards to their motivations for having a child, their ability to provide for it, 
and the strength of their support networks.33 Because single women are seen as struggling 
individuals emotionally unable to commit to a stable relationship, they occasionally, seem to 
be subject to additional assessment aiming to establish the existence of sufficient family and 
friend support systems.34 These attitudes might stem from the fact that, as argued by 
McCandless and Sheldon with regard to the HFEA 2008, ‘the sexual family ideal has retained 
a significant hold…[which] can be seen in: the ongoing significance of the formally 
recognised adult couple; law’s continued adherence to a two-parent model; what we describe 
as ‘parental dimorphism’ (which, within the two-parent model, allows only for one mother 
plus one father or female parent); and the notion that the couple must be (at least potentially) 
in a sexual relationship.’35 The acceptance of the notion that the child has two – and only two 
– “real” parents has proved a somewhat unifying article of faith for the Act 2008. Although 
not specifically excluded, single-parenthood may prove just as objectionable as more than 
two-parent parenthood, given the expectations laid out by the current legal parenthood 
provisions.36 Therefore, it is fair to conclude that despite celebrated legislative reforms and 
considerable changes in medical practice, single women are still denied standing equal to 
other groups of patients seeking fertility treatment and were discrimination to occur, they 
                                            
33
 E. Lee, et al. (2012), ibidem. 
34
 E. Lee, et al. (2014), op. cit., n. 9. 
35
 J. McCandless and S. Sheldon (2010) op. cit. 15, 188. 
36
 J. McCandless, ‘Cinderella and her cruel sisters: parenthood, welfare and gender in the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 2008’, (2013) 32 New Genetics Society 2, 135-153, 147. 
11 
 
would enjoy a lower level of protection. This disparity is exacerbated and particularly visible 
in the context of publicly-funded fertility treatment.37 
B. The right to publicly-funded fertility treatment 
 
The HFEA 1990 does not distinguish between privately- and publicly-funded treatments. In 
fact, the issue of funding remains entirely beyond the scope of the Act and the regulatory 
powers of the HFEA, leaving open the question of whether single women have a right to 
NHS-funded fertility treatment. The answer to this question, which concerns resource 
allocation in healthcare, is determined by the Government, the NHS, and its arms-length 
bodies, whose decisions are scrutinised by courts. It is well-known that the English judiciary 
has historically been very reluctant to intervene in decisions which involve rationing in the 
NHS. They have confirmed on many occasions that the duty to provide treatment is not 
absolute. As noted by Lord Bingham ‘in a perfect world any treatment which a patient… 
sought would be provided if doctors were willing to give it, no matter how much it costs’ but 
that would mean ‘shutting one’s eyes to the real world.’38  The statutory duty under the NHS 
Act 2006 is not to provide, but to promote a comprehensive health service.39 This duty is 
considered to be very far from a duty to ensure that the service was comprehensive that may 
never, for human, financial, and other resource reasons, be achievable.40 Therefore, as long 
as the Secretary of State for Health (and bodies with delegated powers) pays ‘due regard’ to 
this obligation, the incomprehensiveness of the services provided will not be tantamount to 
illegality,41 which, along with irrationality and procedural impropriety, could be seen as 
                                            
37
 For a detailed discussion see: J. McCandless and S. Sheldon (2010), op.cit., n. 16.  See also: E. Blyth, 
‘Conceptions of Welfare’ in: K. Horsey and H. Biggs (2007) op. cit. 16; Blyth et al. (2008), op.cit., n.17.  
38
 R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex p B (a minor) [1995] EWCA Civ 49 
39
 According to s 3 of the NHS Act 2006, the Secretary of State for Health has a duty to provide healthcare 
services to patients to such extent as he considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements. 
40R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622. 
41
 Ibidem. 
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continuing Wednesbury grounds for judicial review.42 Additionally, because the NHS Act 
2006 does not foresee any penalty or sanction for breach of duties stipulated in the Act, the 
courts have accepted that there is no cause of action for any member of the public affected by 
such breach.43 Furthermore, even in most severe cases concerning life-saving treatment44, 
cancer treatment45, or artificial nutrition and hydration46 courts usually refrain from 
interfering with rationing decisions taken by health care professionals. Finally, as the Human 
Rights Act 1998 had remarkably little impact on the provision of health services in the UK, 
the courts will remain unwilling to bring human rights law into such cases unless a decision is 
clearly irrational.47 In short, courts will not intervene except in the most serious of cases of 
human rights violations. Consequently, it is generally accepted that there will always be types 
of medical care which the NHS will offer free of charge only in very exceptional 
circumstances, including counselling, psychotherapy, dental treatment, optometry, and last 
but not least assisted reproduction, which used to be seen more as a ‘lifestyle enhancement’ 
rather than a treatment of a medical condition.48 Therefore, there is very little support for a 
justiciable right to publicly-funded fertility treatment in English law. 
Similarly, little support will come from the European Court of Human Rights which 
considers healthcare funding to fall almost entirely within a state’s margin of appreciation. 
Admittedly, a broad right to reproductive autonomy derived from Art. 8 (right to private life), 
12 (right to family), and/or 14 (non-discrimination) of the ECHR is well established in the 
                                            
42
 K. Syrett Law, Legitimacy and the Rationing of Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
166-7. 
43
 Re HIV Hemophiliac Litigation (1990) 41 BMLR 171. 
44
 R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex p B (a minor) [1995] EWCA Civ 49, R v Central Birmingham Health 
Authority; ex p Collier (unreported, Court of Appeal, 6 January 1988) ,  
45
 R v North Derbyshire HA ex p Fisher [1997] 8. Med LR 327. 
46
 R  v General Medical Council & Ors, ex p Burke [2005] EWCA Civ 1003 
47
 L. Riley, Access to NHS-funded IVF treatment in England and Wales, in: K. Horsey (2007), op.cit.16, 83-
108, 101-104. 
48
 S. Redmayne and R. Klein ‘Rationing in practice: The case of in vitro fertilisation’ (1993) 3306 British 
Medical Journal 1521; A. Plomer, I. Smith, and N. Martin-Clement, ‘Rationing policies on access to in vitro 
fertilisation in the NHS, UK’. (1999) 7 Reproductive Health Matters, 60–70. 
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jurisprudence of the ECtHR.49 Its justification, existence, and scope have been discussed 
extensively in literature.50 The right entails reproductive freedom as a negative personal right 
to either have or avoid having children (free from state’s intervention). For some women it 
often cannot be realised unless they have the necessary means to access all available 
treatments for infertility.51 Nevertheless, the corresponding state obligation to protect these 
rights does not automatically encompass a duty to fund assisted reproduction services. For, it 
is one thing to allow and guarantee a safe use of a new technology; it is another to fund all 
requested treatment. It seems inevitable that the needs of some patients will remain 
unsatisfied. The Strasbourg Court has been particularly wary of attempts to establish a 
positive obligation under Article 8 in the area of the provision of state benefits. It has 
repeatedly argued that questions about how much money should be allocated by the state on 
competing areas of public expenditure, and how the sums allocated to each area should be 
applied, are perceived as matters which lie essentially in the political domain.52 
C. The right not to be discriminated against in accessing publicly-funded fertility 
treatment 
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As mentioned earlier, the HRA 1998 has been of little assistance to single women seeking 
NHS-funded treatment on the basis of Art. 3, Art. 8, or Art. 12 ECHR. This assertion extends 
to the protection offered by Art.14 ECHR, which stipulates the enjoyment of convention 
rights without discrimination on any ground. The right cannot be engaged because it only 
applies to ‘rights and freedoms set forth in the convention’ and no positive right to fertility 
treatment has been inferred from the ECHR.53 Furthermore, single women seeking assisted 
reproduction services would be precluded from claiming discrimination under the Equality 
Act 2010.54 Although a detailed analysis of equality legislation exceeds the scope of this 
paper, a couple of comments are due. The Act is based on the notion of 'protected 
characteristics' which include sex, sexual orientation, marital status, as well as pregnancy and 
maternity. In order to establish a claim on the basis of direct discrimination a single woman 
who has not been granted fertility treatment would be required to compare her less favourable 
treatment with a comparator who is in materially similar circumstances. However, this is 
where problems occur. Founding a claim on marital status would not be allowed, because the 
Act offers protection only to those married or in civil partnership (not to single persons). The 
same obstacles would be encountered if the single woman sought comparison with pregnant 
women, as it has been recently demonstrated the courts perceive IVF and pregnancy are two 
distinct categories.55 It would be equally difficult to claim discrimination on the basis of sex 
or sexual orientation, because it is the lack of partner which is the issue rather than gender or 
sexual orientation - it is fair to assume that lesbian single women or indeed single men56 
would encounter similar obstacles. Consequently, it would also be very difficult indeed for 
the single woman to claim indirect discrimination, i.e. that the policy of insisting on 
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supporting parenting appears neutral, but puts single women at a disadvantaged position and 
is not objectively justified. For, the difficulties in accessing treatment occur not because of 
patient’s sex or gender, but because of her relationship status (other than marriage or civil 
partnership).57 Moreover, even if her claim were to be considered admissible in principle, the 
NHS would be able to argue that limited access to treatment is objectively justified by the 
legitimate aim of providing efficient and equitable health care.58 Finally, the single woman 
could attempt to claim a breach of the Public Sector Equality Duty, which requires public 
bodies to have ‘due regard’ to equality in the planning and commissioning of healthcare 
services, to ensure that patients have equitable access to healthcare services and to ensure 
equal treatment when receiving healthcare services.59 However, the fact that the duty is 
limited to having only ‘due regard’ and that it again arises only with regard to protected 
characteristics suggest that it is highly unlikely that such a claim would be successful.60 In 
sum, it is fair to conclude that the legal protection of single women against discrimination in 
fertility treatment is overall weak and insufficient. The above analysis clearly demonstrates 
that this is generally true for the statutory provisions and common law principles that 
determine single women’s access to NHS fertility treatment. Statistical data concerning 
access to fertility treatment in the UK seem to lend credibility to this interpretation.  
D. Data concerning access of single women to NHS treatment 
 
The limitations in the protection of single women offered by the legislative framework seem 
to correlate with the data retrieved from the HFEA responses to Freedom of Information 
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(FOI) requests and the HFEA register data, all available on the HFEA website.61 The data 
show a still relatively small number of single women undergoing fertility treatment in 
England and Wales. Admittedly, the analysis of statistical evidence confirms a gradual yet 
consistent rise in the number of single women undergoing fertility treatment, i.e. IVF 
treatment or donor insemination (DI). For instance in 2006 there were 574 registered IVF 
treatment cycles and 705 DI treatment cycles, bringing the overall number to 1279.62 This 
number rose to 1685 of IVF and DI treatment cycles in 2012.63 The number of women 
registered as not having a partner at UK licensed clinics between 2011 and 2012 rose from 
702 to 84564. However, it is important to bear in mind that the above data include both 
publicly and privately funded treatment, and that the exact number of single women provided 
with NHS treatment is hard to determine.65 In the last five years the HFEA has refused to 
provide this information under section 22 FOIA on the basis that the requested data were 
likely to be misleading for the patients and the general public. It decided that the public 
interest in ensuring access to accurate and verified information outweighed the public interest 
in disclosure. Despite the HFEA’s promise, these data have not been published, yet.66 
Nevertheless, the number of single women seeking NHS treatment could probably be inferred 
from two facts: a) that until 2013 the NICE guidelines precluded women over the age of 38 
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from NHS treatment67, and b) that the average age for single women seeking treatment is 40 
years old68. On this basis, it is fair to assume that most of the treatments reported by the 
HFEA have been privately funded.  
Within the NHS the numbers of single women receiving treatment at different fertility 
clinics across England and Wales will inevitably vary substantially, not least because of the 
now well-publicised ‘post-code lottery’ in fertility treatment.69 A survey published by the 
Department of Health in March 200970 found that 30% of PCTs were adhering fully to NICE 
guidelines by offering three full cycles of treatment with only 2% not funding IVF. However, 
by 2014 this trend has been reversing. In 2013 only 23% of CCGs were still offering three 
cycles recommended by NICE71  and by 2014 only 18% of CCGs provide the three cycles 
nationally recommended. Worryingly these figures show a notable reduction from the 
previous year in the number of CCGs who commission the recommended three cycles.72 
Although the numbers refer to treatment cycles in general, they are symptomatic of a trend 
that will inevitably affect single women.  
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To try to determine whether this decreasing trend has had a deferential impact on 
single women, a small pilot study has been undertaken focusing on the practices of NHS 
health care providers. As part of the study FOI requests were sent to 14 CCGs and Health 
Boards selected based on provision and size (7 7 CCGs in England73 and 7 Health Boards in 
Wales74). The requests contained three questions, concerning: a) the number of single women 
who have received fertility treatment (IUI, IVF, ICSI) each year from 2008-2014; b) the 
number of single women who applied for treatment; c) the grounds on which any women 
were the denied treatment. Responses were received by 3 CCGs from England and 1 Health 
Board from Wales. These data suggest divergence in medical practices across the country. 
Perhaps more importantly, the data reveal a rather ambiguous picture. While according to 
data provided by the Welsh Fertility Institute, only 4 single women received publicly-funded 
IVF treatment last year75, responses from service providers in England revealed that a 
number of CCGs does not offer NHS fertility treatment to single women at all. For instance, 
in Hull CCG single women fall outside the scope of policy for assisted reproductive 
techniques.76 While most CCGs do not hold separate information about the number of single 
women receiving treatment77, Manchester does not provide treatment to ‘single women who 
are not in partnership’.78  The latter suggests that there might still be some definitional 
confusion about the term ‘single women’, with some clinics using it to describe (gay or 
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heterosexual) patients who are in informal relationships (as opposed to those who are married 
or in civil partnerships). This in turn indicates lack of transparency with regard to single 
women undergoing fertility treatment in England and Wales. Overall, the analysis of 
empirical data questions the optimistic picture painted in the post-legislative assessment and 
the scope of access to fertility treatment of single women. It also calls for more detailed 
investigation of the reasons why one particular group of patients has not benefited fully from 
the 2008 reforms.  The following part of the paper concentrates on the recommendations 
stipulated in the NICE guidelines and their interaction with eligibility criteria to fertility 
treatment set out by CCGs’ and Health Boards. . It suggests that the differences in CCGs’ and 
Health Boards’ practices and the restrictions in the access of single women to NHS fertility 
treatment have two main causes. First, it is the ambiguity intrinsic in the NICE guideline even 
after the recent the changes adopted in 2013.79 Second, it is the incoherency and tension 
between different values embedded in the regulatory framework of publicly-funded ART 
services.   
III. THE IMPACT OF NICE GUIDELINES ON SINGLE WOMEN’S REFERRAL 
FOR ART TREATMENT 
 
A. General eligibility criteria for fertility treatment 
 
The NICE ‘fertility’ guideline offers advice on assisting people of reproductive age who have 
problems conceiving. As one of NICE’s major roles is to identify clinically- and cost- 
effective services which should be funded by the NHS, the guideline outlines eligibility 
criteria for access to fertility treatment for individual patients. Healthcare professionals in the 
NHS are expected to take NICE recommendations fully into account when exercising their 
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professional judgement, although the guidelines do not override the responsibility of 
healthcare professionals to make decisions appropriate to the circumstances of each patient. 80 
As confirmed by recent case law81, CCGs hold obligations in public law to have regard to the 
NICE guidance and are required to provide clear reasons for any policy choosing not to 
follow its recommendations. The same applies to health care professionals. Although 
formally the NICE instruments are not legally binding, failing to comply with their 
recommendations might have far-reaching implications for health care providers and 
individual health care professionals. It has been recently highlighted by courts that they might 
be used to support appeals against rationing decisions and judicial review claims.82 
Furthermore, although NICE powers do not extend beyond England, clinical guidelines 
continue to apply in Wales on the basis of an agreement with the Welsh Assembly 
Government.83 NICE guidelines are subsequently implemented or modified by CCGs in 
England and Health Boards in Wales according to local needs and available resources.  
According to the latest NICE guideline published in February 2013 fertility treatment 
should be offered to patients who have problems conceiving.84 New provisions recommend 
that a woman of reproductive age, who has not conceived after 1 year of unprotected vaginal 
sexual intercourse, in the absence of any known cause of infertility, should be offered clinical 
assessment and investigation along with her partner. However, earlier referral for specialist 
consultation to discuss the options for attempting conception should be offered where: a) the 
woman is aged 36 years or over, b) there is a known clinical cause of infertility or a history of 
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predisposing factors for infertility.85 As far as assisted reproduction techniques are 
concerned, paragraph 1.9.1.1 of the guideline provides that IUI – which is much less 
demanding than IVF – should be considered as an option for some groups of patients before 
they are referred for IVF treatment. These groups include same-sex couples and people who 
are unable, or would find it very difficult to have vaginal intercourse because of a clinically 
diagnosed physical disability or psychosexual problem.86 When IUI fails, the number of 
publicly-funded IVF cycles offered to a woman patient will be determined by her age. In 
women aged under 40 years who have not conceived after 2 years of regular unprotected 
intercourse or 12 cycles of artificial insemination (where 6 or more are by IUI), 3 full cycles 
of IVF will be offered with or without ICSI. 87  
B. The effects of the NICE regulatory silence on single women 
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Prima facie, the above recommendations seem quite straightforward and easy to implement. 
The main principle on which the guidance is based is that patients unable to conceive within a 
certain period of time are eligible for fertility treatment (including IUI, IVF and/or ICSI). The 
adoption of medical criteria as the basis for referral seems in conformity with the anti-
discrimination laws and human rights standards, as it does not differentiate on the basis of 
sexual orientation or relationship status and as such it treats all women equally. One might 
thus wonder whether, and if so how, could the NICE guideline contribute to the afore-
mentioned discrepancies between different CCGs and Health Boards in their policy-making 
practices which have the potential to exclude single women from fertility treatment. Are the 
reasons intrinsic to the guideline or, as most studied suggest, external to the regulatory 
provisions?  
First of all, the NICE guideline does not specifically mention single women. Although 
a casuistic approach is not necessarily always an effective method of regulating professional 
conduct, in this particular case the omission is potentially problematic. The NICE guideline 
suggests that fertility treatment is offered only to women with diagnosed or suspected 
infertility issues or those in same-sex relationships. Unlike same-sex couples single women 
are not enumerated among patient groups which should be considered as potential candidates 
for the initial treatment of IUI, unless they suffer from specific medical problems rendering it 
impossible for them to engage in vaginal sex.88 This would suggest that they are required to 
fulfil the condition of having 1-year period of unprotected sex before they can be referred for 
fertility treatment. If one were to depict the rationale behind this principle, it would appear to 
run as follows: at least theoretically, single women have the ability to procreate naturally, 
without the need for assisted reproduction services. Most assisted reproduction techniques are 
very onerous and should not be recommended unnecessarily. Natural conception will always 
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be the preferred means of reproduction, as it is far less burdensome and expensive. Therefore, 
single women will be able to first try to conceive naturally before turning to assisted 
reproduction. Consequently, they will also be able to provide evidence of unsuccessful 
attempts to conceive. This kind of reasoning would suggest that whenever the regulators 
intend to include single women into the equation, they have heterosexual women in mind. 
This could explain why the NICE guideline does not mention single women among groups 
which should be automatically offered IUI.  
In the abstract, this conceptualisation of ART services is correct and it is probably fair 
to assume that some (or perhaps most) single women will wish and manage to conceive 
without medical assistance. However, this assumption seems to contain a flaw which does not 
take into account important tendencies in contemporary society. The conception rate among 
women over 35 has been rising since 1990, and the conception rate for women aged over 40 
has more than doubled from 6.6 to 14 conceptions per 1,000 women.89 These women have 
consistently avoided motherhood for some time and if they decide to start a family on their 
own that choice is most probably a conscious one. They might choose not to engage in 
unstable relationships in order to conceive. The availability of assisted reproduction services 
has changed the understanding of reproductive decisions, providing additional options to 
large groups of society, and enabling a shift from chance to choice.90 Consequently, many 
single women will exercise this choice and decide to use donor insemination as a more 
informed, transparent, and safer way of starting a family. This has been indeed confirmed in 
interviews conducted by Susanna Graham, in which getting pregnant through casual sex was 
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dismissed on health safety and moral grounds.91 Alternatively single women might come to 
an arrangement to use a sperm of a friend.92 This is exactly the reason why they might not be 
able to meet the requirement of the 1-year period of unprotected intercourse, designed to 
indicate infertility. This latter condition is by definition, impossible to fulfil, unless we 
assume – or indeed require – that single women engage in random sexual relationships in 
order to establish their infertility.93 Any expectation to engage in unprotected sex with 
‘strangers’ would pose a considerable risk to their health and could potentially violate human 
dignity and the right to private life of these women. It is, thus, highly improbable that NICE, 
an arms-length body of the NHS, would ever intend to impose this kind of requirement and 
pressure on its citizens. However, even if, for the sake of argument, such interpretation were 
plausible (hypothetically a single woman could have been in a relationship which dissolved 
prior to her seeking treatment) the requirement poses further difficulties, as the guideline does 
not specify what kind of evidence should be submitted to substantiate her inability to 
conceive during the 1-year period.94 There are two possible interpretative approaches to the 
provision setting the 1-year requirement that could lead to very different outcomes.  
A restrictive literal interpretation of the guidelines could result in practices preventing 
single women from accessing IVF treatment, as it would be impossible for them to meet the 
1-year period criterion. There will of course be cases where the patient is diagnosed with a 
condition potentially affecting fertility prior to or independently of considerations about 
procreation (e.g. cancers, infections, hormonal imbalance, etc…). However, to limit access to 
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ART services only to patients already diagnosed with health problems would prevent all 
those who suffer from unexplained infertility from receiving treatment. As the number of 
patients with unexplained subfertility is constantly rising, such interpretation could have 
serious consequences for access to treatment in particular for single women.95 As the age for 
making reproductive decisions increases and the number of unexplained infertility cases 
grows it is likely that many single women, who have not yet attempted to conceive, will not 
be aware of any fertility problems. As fertility declines with age, more and more women will 
face such difficulties. Therefore, to employ a restrictive interpretation of NICE guidelines 
would drastically limit the number of single women eligible for NHS treatment. In addition, a 
reading like this would be contra legem as it threatens to thwart the objectives of the HFEA 
2008, which aimed at removing the obstacles encountered by single women in their access to 
treatment. 
Therefore, a teleological approach focused on achieving the purpose of the amended 
HFEA 1990 seems more appropriate. Such an approach could accommodate two different 
interpretations. One would be to employ a form of legal fiction with regard to the burden of 
proof and accept verbal statements from women about their failed attempts to conceive 
without the need to obtain any additional evidence. It seems unlikely that local CCGs and 
Health Boards would issue policies officially sanctioning referrals based on such premises. 
However, evidence suggests that some CCGs are already employing this method grounding 
their referral practices solely in patients’ history provided by them.96 Another more 
transparent way to achieve the aims of the amended HFEA 1990 would be to explicitly 
acknowledge that medical reasons do not constitute relevant grounds for access to treatment 
                                            
95
 According to the HFEA Annual Register Report 2011 out of 14551reasons provided to justify IVF treatment 
4433 have been unexplained. See: HFEA Fertility treatment in 2011 trends and figures - Annual Register 
Report  (London: HFEA2011).This correlates roughly with the data provided by NICE in 2013, which estimates 
the number of unexplained infertility to around 25% or all reasons for referral to treatment. See: NICE (2013) 
op.cit., n. 5. 
96
 Cambridge CCG, A response to FOIA requests SF/sb/2014 – FOI 76: ‘A patient’s history is all that is 
requested for compliance in the absence of specific tests.’ 15 July 2014.
26 
 
of single women, who like gay women, are ‘socially infertile’. Per analogiam, if single 
women wish to conceive a child using donor insemination, they should be referred to a 
fertility clinic without the need to fulfil the 1-year requirement. This interpretation would 
mean that NHS funded IVF treatment could be open to single women: a) diagnosed with 
infertility, b) unaware of any fertility issues who nevertheless suffer from lower fertility 
(established as a result of the initial investigation), and perhaps more importantly c) women 
without any fertility issues (regardless of their sexual orientation) who have made a 
reproductive decision to start a family. This outcome seems to fall squarely within the 
principles of the HFEA 2008 amendments, which aimed at bringing the law on assisted 
reproduction in line with equality legislation and changing human rights standards, and 
confirming the provision of treatment to both, biologically and contextually infertile. It seems 
that the recent Quality Standards (QS) issued by NICE in October 2014 and aiming at 
improvements in clinical practice in the area of fertility treatment follow the broader 
interpretation proposed above.97 However, the real impact of these standards remains to be 
seen. At the same time, the problem discussed above does not exhaust the obstacles arising 
before single women seeking treatment. Although individual provisions of the NICE 
guideline do not expressly discriminate against this group of patients, the guideline does 
allow for situations where discrimination might incidentally occur. 
C. The case of incidental discrimination of single women resulting from regulatory silence 
 
The HFEA 2008 has been praised for removing in-built discriminatory provisions which put 
same sex couples seeking fertility treatment in a disadvantageous position. However, it might 
not have been equally successful in addressing other forms of family relationships and the 
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fluidity of contemporary relationships.98 If the relationship breaks up at an early stage of the 
referral process, both partners can seek treatment individually. If a similar situation arose, a 
woman coming out of a relationship would have little difficulties providing evidence of her 
infertility. Therefore, a break up could beneficial from a referral point of view, because – 
should a teleological interpretation be employed – the woman would not have to comply with 
the 1-2 year waiting period. However, it is possible to imagine a reverse situation, which has 
not been anticipated in the amended HFEA 1990 and which could expose single women to 
additional complications. Let us imagine a hypothetical scenario, in which a single woman 
forms a relationship in the midst of fertility treatment and the new partner is willing to 
undergo fertility treatment with her. The scenario might seem less farfetched if one takes into 
account the length of fertility treatment from the initial consultation to successful conception, 
including long waiting lists. The legal situation of this woman changes dramatically and this 
change gives rise to several questions concerning access to treatment of new partners entering 
the treatment later in the process. What are the consequences for the single woman in terms 
of her eligibility for treatment? Can the new partner enter the treatment and if so, at which 
point? If he does, can he be treated as a partner or perhaps as a known donor?  
The attempt to address these questions reveals an interesting regulatory conundrum. 
This woman might be doubly disadvantaged in the process of referral to treatment. First, as 
established by the studies by Lee et al. mentioned earlier, she might experience hostility 
during welfare of the child assessment. Second, once in a relationship, she might be subject to 
unfavourable rules concerning 1-2 year waiting period imposed on couples. Admittedly, such 
situations will occur very rarely and it therefore might be understandable that the Act does 
not contain specific provisions in this respect – it would be unreasonable to expect the 
legislator to regulate every eventuality of life. Nevertheless, this omission will inevitably shift 
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the burden of decision-making on the medical staff in fertility clinics. They will be looking to 
professional and regulatory sources for guidance. However, neither the NICE guideline, nor 
even the HFEA COP, foresees a situation where the single women willing to undergo fertility 
treatment begins a relationship amidst the referral process. A lacuna at this level of the lower 
regulatory structure might be more problematic, as it creates ambivalence which can have 
adverse consequences for single women willing to start a relationship. The question, arises 
whether women in similar situation should be: a) refused treatment because of her changed 
relationship status (referred back to her GP for a new referral as a couple), b) ‘put on hold’ 
for 1-2 years to demonstrate infertility without the need of a new referral, or c) treated 
together with her partner, either as a sperm donor or her partner. 
The first and the last option lie on the opposite ends of the spectrum. Bearing in mind 
that at least 29% CCGs require couples to spend three years attempting to conceive, rather 
than the recommended two years, and that at least 3% of CCGs  – require couples to wait one 
to two years even when there is a diagnosed cause of infertility99,  the first two options seem 
to disadvantage the woman in a new relationship. Taking into consideration these lengthy and 
complex procedures, the woman could lose several years in the process and become ineligible 
for treatment because of her age. Therefore, perhaps the least controversial solution would be 
to require the new couple to meet the 1-2-year requirement for medical reasons, but without 
the need to seek new referral. Although unfortunate for the woman seeking treatment, this 
could be justified in situations where neither partner is aware of any fertility problems, as it 
allows for the possibility to conceive naturally.100  However, the same requirement would be 
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unwarranted, if either of them had been already diagnosed with subfertility. If health 
problems have already been established, a waiting period creates unnecessary psychological 
burden for the woman, who although originally admitted for treatment, would be 
disadvantaged by the change in her relationship status. It is important to note that the double 
bias would not be against the newly-formed heterosexual couple, but against the single 
woman who has entered a relationship. Although empirical research on single women in 
fertility treatment has not yet addressed this particular issue, it is fair to assume that such 
women would be forced to leave NHS and seek treatment privately. Those in their late 30s, 
who could not afford this option would risk becoming ineligible for treatment. 
The bias would be particularly obvious if the requirement to stay in a relationship for 
2 years was to be imposed as part of the welfare of the child assessment aiming to prove the 
stability of the relationship. Formally, such assessments should be independent from 
rationing decisions, because the HFEA 1990 does not determine funding issues. However, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that there are instances where medical staff evaluating patients’ 
eligibility presents the 2-year waiting period for heterosexual couples as part of the ‘welfare 
of the child’ assessment, a period to confirm the stability of the relationship.101 It is likely that 
in such cases welfare of the child assessment is used as a rationing tool. This is highly 
problematic in light of the 8th HFEA COP, according to which: a) such assessment should 
only be undertaken in exceptional circumstances; b) the stability of relationship does not 
constitute part of the welfare of the child assessment or a condition to access treatment. If this 
was indeed the case, it would be hard to justify imposing such condition on heterosexual 
couples, but not on gay couples. However, if one were to apply the requirement consistently 
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to couples, then single women would be the clear beneficiaries of such regulation (as reported 
by the media) unless they were expected to provide evidence of a stable family network 
during a period of 2 years. A refusal to access treatment on this ground would be a 
convoluted rationing decision raising serious questions about the powers of commissioning 
bodies.  
This scenario illustrates further shortcomings in the regulatory framework of publicly-
funded fertility treatment so often praised for its sensitivity to changing social and family 
structures. It reveals areas where incidental discrimination of single women can occur due to 
the fact that (in particular heterosexual) single women have been too readily subsumed in the 
NICE guidelines under the wider notion of the ‘contextually infertile’ without due regard to 
the specificities of their situation. This in conjunction with the existing preconceptions 
towards single women can lead to further hurdles experienced by this group of patients. More 
importantly, however, the situations discussed above draw attention to much broader tensions 
between different rationales and values governing the system of NHS-funded ART services. 
IV. SINGLE WOMEN IN LIGHT OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING 
ACCESS TO ART  
A. Competing rationales of the publicly funded ART regulatory framework  
 
At the centre of the 2008 reforms was the recognition that the reproductive rights of same-sex 
couples and single women have the same standing as those of heterosexual couples. Single 
women were to be treated similarly to same-sex couples, because both groups were seen as 
‘socially infertile’ and because their access to treatment required a modification of the 
welfare of the child principle. It seems peculiar at first that the aim to protect single women – 
so clearly articulated during Parliamentary debates – gets completely lost within the NHS 
context. However, the reasons become more transparent if one realises the fundamental 
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tension between different values and objectives governing NICE and local commissioning 
bodies.  
NICE was established to ensure that ‘access to the NHS will be based on need and 
need alone’.102 Hence, the NICE guidelines, so far as they affect resource allocation in the 
NHS, are based on a premise that treatment should be distributed on the basis of scientific, 
clinical, and financial efficiency and go to those with the biggest clinical needs.103 These 
needs are established on the basis of scientific evidence, risk-benefit analysis and cost-
effectiveness calculations. Finally, CCGs and Health Boards face the difficult task to interpret 
these normative documents in a way which reconciles the two rationales in face of rising 
financial pressures in the NHS. The conundrum entails finding a way to address 
simultaneously three challenges: a) to allow publicly-funded treatment for individuals who 
are fertile, but unable to conceive because of their particular life circumstances; b) to retain 
the basic principle (a myth?) that resource allocation and rationing decisions concerning 
fertility treatment are taken on purely clinical grounds; and c) to ensure that resource 
allocation policies and rationing decisions are taken in a non-discriminatory and equitable 
manner. Two questions arise in this context: 1) Is there a way to reconcile the tension 
between different rationale underlying the regulatory framework of fertility treatment? 2) 
How much latitude do CCGs and Health Boards have in diverging from the NICE guidelines  
in setting eligibility criteria limiting single women’s access to treatment? 3) How important is 
the (mis)understanding of the relationship between welfare of the child assessments and 
social eligibility criteria to provide single women with equitable access to fertility treatment? 
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Although the regulatory framework of ART rests on the basic assumption that assisted 
reproduction services should be offered to those suffering from infertility, it is also clear that 
patients in perfect reproductive health might be eligible for treatment. As noted by Deech and 
Smajdor, a healthy woman may be eligible for treatment with IVF as ‘contextually infertile’, 
because her partner has fertility problems.104 Moreover, unexplained infertility is extremely 
common. One of the ‘diagnoses’ of infertility is simply a failure to conceive after a certain 
period of having unprotected sex. Often, there may be no identifiable medical cause at all, but 
this does not mean that patients are denied treatment. This reasoning applies to single woman 
and people in same-sex partnerships.105 The principle of non-discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation and the principle that rationing decisions should be based on clinical needs 
are reconciled through the broad conceptualisation of infertility and the acknowledgment that 
the inability to have children can have profound psychological (mental health) 
implications.106 However, following this line of reasoning, it could be argued that in England 
and Wales fertility treatment is/should be open to all those who – for whatever reason – 
cannot conceive children naturally. This by no means a controversial statement. However, 
this widely accepted conclusion puts enormous financial pressure on the already stretched 
health care resources. Therefore, CCGs and Health Boards set out additional criteria limiting 
access to fertility treatment. So far, the task to establish objectively justified and non-
discriminatory conditions has proved very difficult, if not impossible. It is in this area that the 
biggest differences between CCGs and Health Boards usually occur. They interpret 
differently clinical factors recommended by NICE and set a wide array of non-clinical 
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criteria.  This is where the question about the margin of appreciation (scope of authority) of 
commissioning bodies comes into focus.  
B. The CCGs powers to set eligibility criteria 
 
In addition to the statutory obligations of s. 13 (5) HFEA 1990, local commissioning bodies 
impose their own social criteria for treatment to enable prioritisation in the allocation of 
fertility treatment. They usually choose between the following non-medical factors: a) no 
children from current or previous relationship (very common) sometimes including foster or 
adopted children, b) no children living with couple, c), non-smoking, d) no previous 
sterilisation in either partner, e) stable (2 year) relationship, f) age restrictions on female 
and/or male, g) BMI 20-25, h) registration with local GP for a minimum of three years.107 
Some of these criteria can be seen as derived from the NICE guideline, which advises doctors 
to inform the patients about the potential negative influence on fertility of factors such as 
smoking, alcohol consumption, body weight, or occupation. It might be argued that they are 
used as selection criteria because the treatment should be offered to those who have the best 
chance to conceive and in those cases where the treatment will be most effective.108 
However, as the wording of these provisions is much less prescriptive, it is not clear whether, 
and if so to what extent, they should be treated by fertility clinics as eligibility criteria for 
treatment. Additionally, these factors should be distinguished from other criteria imposed by 
the commissioning bodies which are completely unrelated to fertility or health. These include 
length of the relationship, stability/extent/composition of family networks, or existing 
children of one partner or adopted/foster children living with patients seeking treatment.  
These factors are not mentioned by NICE at all and it is not clear how they have made their 
way into CCGs’ policies. The most probable explanation would be that the need for a 
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biologically and/or genetically related child has been confused with psychological need for a 
child (and the presence of (any) children in the family is seen as satisfying the need for 
parenthood and thus a factor excluding from treatment). There is no basis for this in the 
national NICE guideline and yet81% CCGs deny treatment on these grounds.109 This is truly 
astonishing in light of the fact that from the start the primary purpose of reproductive 
medicine has been to enable patients have biologically and/or genetically linked offspring. 
The importance of this need has been not only recognised through the adoption of the HFEA 
1990, but also confirmed in human rights case law.110 
The widespread and divergent use of clinical and non-clinical factors, illustrating the 
well-known problem of post-code lottery, has been heavily criticised by Fertility Fairness and 
the Infertility Network UK.111 Their report called for a mandatory and definite list of access 
criteria produced by NICE and NHS England to remove the existing differences. As a 
response to the wide-spread criticism NICE issued Quality Standards (QS) aiming at reducing 
the existing variation between different CCGs and Health Boards and harmonising clinical 
practice. This initiative, supported by the main charities involved in the area of reproductive 
health, needs to be seen as a vital step in securing equitable access to health care. As such it 
should also improve the access of single women to fertility treatment. However, although a 
step in the right direction, it is questionable whether it will solve the problems identified in 
the aforementioned study by Lee et al., which highlighted the ambivalent relationship 
between welfare of the child assessments, NHS funding criteria, and individual clinic 
protocols.112 Furthermore, it is doubtful that the NICE QS will manage to reconcile the 
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competing rationales and broader lack of coherency between different elements of the 
regulatory framework. This lack of coherence is paradigmatic of the tension between 
resource allocation and the right to access treatment and as such it exceeds the scope of this 
paper. However, a few remarks of a general nature are worth noting here.  
Despite all the difficulties outlined above, it is still relevant to consider the possibility 
of the right of single women to access ART services. For, it would seem incorrect to suggest 
that single women lack any legal protection should they seek fertility treatment. Although it 
is very difficult to argue the existence of a right to fertility treatment, interpreted as an 
absolute right to demand access to ART services and protected by effective remedy, a 
suggestion that there is a right to be considered for treatment without discrimination seems 
very plausible and should be easily accepted. At the individual level it has become apparent 
that once the condition is recognised as illness, the commissioning body must consider 
individual’s condition before refusing to fund treatment.113 In this respect, despite ongoing 
debates about the definition of disease and health needs, the status of infertility as an illness 
has been officially approved both, at the international level by the WHO (in a non-
hierarchical list of diseases), and at the national level by NICE. As illustrated in the 
statements issued recently by the latter aiming at harmonising the diverse commissioning 
practices, a wide consensus is forming that commissioning bodies should acknowledge that a 
clear decision has been made by Parliament, the Government, and NICE to fund fertility 
treatment from public resources.114 Commissioners in England and Wales have a duty to take 
this statutory decision into account when they design their rationing policies. It is also 
important to note that the NHS Constitution also emphasises the patient’s right to treatments 
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that have been recommended by NICE for use in the NHS, if recommended by the doctor as 
clinically appropriate.115 Despite highlighting the sensitive issue of resource allocation, the 
use of rights-based language might have modest, yet important consequences. First, it can 
help shift the burden of proof from patients to the CCGs, so that a restriction of the right 
needs to be objectively justified by the commissioning body. Therefore, second, it might 
gradually help limit the need to argue the existence of exceptional circumstances in order to 
receive treatment. The authority of the CGGs and Health Boards in drafting access to 
treatment criteria might be broad, but it is not unlimited. 
The courts can still intervene in rationing decisions, if they are persuaded: a) that the 
decision-making process is flawed (procedural injustice)116, b) where a blanket policy is 
pursued, without considering each case individually, c) the real reason behind a decision is 
not transparent (financial consideration rather than clinical decision)117, or d) the promise to 
offer particular services is broken118. It can thus be assumed that the courts support 
transparency especially that it is now also required by the NHS Constitution. 119 Furthermore, 
as demonstrated in the case of Condliff, the courts expressed a clear preference for clinical 
over social/non-clinical criteria in rationing decisions.120 The claimant argued that the 
commissioning policy, which led to him being denied treatment, violated his right to private 
life, because it did not take into account social factors. Although the court rejected his claims, 
it applauded the fact that the resource allocating policy of the commissioning body was based 
on the comparative assessment of clinical needs because it was intentionally non-
discriminatory. The circumstances in Condliff cannot be easily applied to single women 
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seeking access to ART services, who might not suffer from a clinical condition. However, 
there are aspects of the decision, which are relevant to the current discussion. First, the 
judgment in Condliff showed that courts are prepared to accept differences between various 
commissioning bodies as long as rationing decisions are based on non-discriminatory and 
objective criteria. This certainly brings into question the acceptability of the non-medical 
criteria used by CCGs and Health Boards in drafting policies concerning access to ART 
services, such as the stability of a relationship and/or the support family network. Second, at 
the heart of Condliff’s claim was an attempt to tackle postcode lottery and more importantly 
to introduce human rights to resource allocation considerations. Regardless of the final 
outcome of the case, it is becoming clear that as a result of the Human Rights Act 1998 
rationing decisions are now expected to be made with regard to due process requirements and 
to claims to equality and proportionality. This expectation seems to coincide with the 
obligations imposed by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 on the Secretary of State to 
‘have regard to the need to reduce inequalities between the people of England with respect to 
the benefits that they can obtain from the health service’.121 Despite the fact that establishing 
a breach of statutory duty has been an ineffective alternative to judicial review, the 
introduction of this duty in addition to existing obligations should not go unnoticed. Even if 
the provision does not open a new litigation route for single women, it requires all the 
delegated bodies exercising healthcare functions to take their situation into account when 
drafting and implementing policies concerning fertility treatment and delivering ART 
services.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
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The purpose of this paper was to provide a preliminary analysis and identify potential gaps 
and inconsistencies in the regulatory framework surrounding the access of single women to 
publicly funded fertility treatment.. In particular the study focused on the rights of single 
women stipulated in the statutory framework, including the HFEA 1990 (as amended by the 
HFEA 2008), the Equality Act 2010, and the NHS Act 2006  and eligibility criteria for 
fertility treatment set out in the 2013 NICE clinical guidelines. . The analysis revealed that 
although formally the legal framework has substantially improved the situation of single 
women in recent years and removed much of pre-existing biases against them, they are still 
exposed to prejudice and potential (accidental) discrimination. The paper drew on recent 
studies  showing  that negative attitudes concerning single women still persist among medical 
staff and it has been argued that these assertions stem from the ambiguity inherent in the 
welfare of the child assessment stemming from the amended s 13 (5) HFEA 1990. It also 
highlighted the inadequacies of the currently equality legislation, which does not include the 
state of ‘being single’ in its protected characteristics.    
However, this paper has demonstrated that the reasons for potential discrimination 
against single women originate in the regulatory framework of assisted reproduction services, 
which fails to provide adequate protection to single women seeking publicly funded fertility 
treatment. The paper found that the primary reason for remaining inequalities can be 
attributed to the ambiguities inherent in the regulatory framework, which in the context of 
publicly-funded fertility treatment is determined by the NICE clinical guidelines and CCGs 
and Health Boards' resource allocation policies. In particular, the paper revealed ambiguities, 
inconsistencies, and gaps in the NICE guidelines that might adversely affect single women’s 
access to treatment. It has been argued that although as a matter of principle casuistic 
approaches to regulation should be avoided, in this particular instance addressing single 
women expressly would improve their legal standing as fertility patients and send a powerful 
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message to CCGs and Health Boards responsible for resource allocation and health care 
professionals taking individual rationing decisions. Furthermore, the paper has identified an 
area where neither the amended HFEA 1990 nor the NICE guideline take fully into account 
the fluidity and dynamics of contemporary relationships. 
Finally, the paper also exposed surprising serious gaps in the understanding of the 
position of single women in fertility treatment. First, the number of single women undergoing 
publicly-funded treatment remains unknown, not least because of definitional ambiguities 
that persist in defining ‘single women’. Second, it is not clear why the subsequent HFEA 
Codes of Practice have not been successful in changing professional attitudes towards single 
women. Third, despite numerous studies of NICE regulatory practices, the implementation of 
guidelines continues to pose significant obstacles. This lack of knowledge reveals that, 
despite their vulnerability in the context of the NHS fertility treatment, single women remain 
a silent, excluded, and even absent group of patients.  
Therefore, further studies are required to investigate the legal and societal standing of 
single women in the context of fertility treatment. Such studies should analyse the factors 
taken into account by clinicians when they determine the eligibility of patients according to 
clinical guidelines. They should also aim to investigate how health care professionals view 
discrimination/non-discrimination of single women seeking access to ARTs and to what 
extent the regulatory framework is responsible for their attitudes. Finally, further research 
should aim to determine local practices of commissioning bodies and health care 
professionals, involved in the decision making process concerning access to IVF treatment. 
Only through such a comprehensive analysis of the complex socio-legal realities can the 
situation of single women be improved.  
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